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In this paper, we challenge the conventional wisdom that due to the negative correlation 
between family size and earning ability, family size can be used as a 'tagging' device, and 
calls for subsidizing children (via child allowances) to enhance egalitarian objectives. We 
show that the case for subsidizing children crucially hinges on child allowances being 
provided on a universal basis. Notably, when child benefits are means-tested, taxing children 
at the margin (namely, setting the total benefits to decline with the number of children) is 
socially optimal. 
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1.  Introduction 
Family size is a key component in the determination of income tax liability in 
all OECD countries [see, e.g., Bradshaw and  Finch (2002)]. Two major decisions 
affect family size: (i) marriage/cohabitation and (ii) fertility. In this paper we focus on 
the optimal fiscal treatment of children [for the fiscal treatment of the former see, for 
instance,  two  recent  papers  by  Cremer  et  al  (2009)  and  Kleven  et  al  (2009)].  In 
practice, the existence of children generally reduces the household's tax liability. This 
may  take  a  variety  of  forms,  including:  income  splitting  amongst  (a  standardized 
number of) family members (as in France); exemptions or standard deductions (as in 
the  US);  specific  childcare  deductions;  tax  credits;  and  the  provision  of  child 
allowances, which could be either universal or means-tested.
1 In most countries the 
policy implemented is a mixture of some or all of the above measures.  
The economic rationale underlying the preferential tax treatment of children is 
based on the following four key arguments. First, the existence of children raises the 
question of horizontal equity, which in the family size context implies that the tax 
liability of a household, which is determined based on its ability to pay (say, measured 
by the level of income), should also account for the (standardized) number of family 
members. According to this view, children are not a form of consumption good of 
their  parents,  but  rather  part  of  the  tax-paying  unit.  As  such,  they  reduce  the 
                                            
1 Nearly all developed countries provide universal child allowances; namely, child allowances that do 
not depend on household's income (but may well vary with the number of children) with the notable 
exception of the US, where the child allowances system (which is embedded in the EITC program) is 
(partly) means-tested. Thus, for example, in 2009, for the income range of 0-5,970 USD, a household 
with no children is entitled to a wage subsidy of 7.65%, whereas, a household with one child is eligible 
for a wage subsidy of 34% (within the same income range households with 2 and 3 children are entitled 
to a wage subsidy of 40% and 45%, respectively). In this income range, as well as in the income phase-
out  ranges  that  are  also  structured  with  different  rates  for  different  numbers  of  children,  child 
allowances are means-tested.  However, parts of the program are universal. For example, the difference 
between the allowance of households with 3 children and that of households with 2 children (with the 
same level of income) is constant for all levels of income above 12,570 USD; and in the overlapping 
income ranges, in which the child allowance is fixed (the plateaus), the program is obviously universal, 
as the allowances depend only on the number of children and not on income.         3
disposable  income  per-capita,  hence  the  ability-to-pay  of  the  household  [for 
incorporation  of  horizontal  equity  considerations  into  the  design  of  optimal  tax-
transfer systems see, for instance, Balcer and Sadka (1982) and (1986)]. A second 
argument  draws  on  demographic  considerations  (primarily,  those  related  to  the 
looming pension crisis in many countries). The sharp increase in dependency ratios, 
stemming both from the drop in fertility rates and the corresponding increase in life 
expectancy,  is  casting  a  shadow  on  the  financial  sustainability  of  many  national 
pension systems. The economic rationale for providing child-related subsidies in this 
case is essentially Pigouvian: subsidies are aimed at internalizing fiscal externalities.
2 
The third argument warrants the provision of child-related subsidies as a means to 
motivate women to participate in the labor market. This is achieved by the provision 
of subsidized child care services (as in Sweden), deduction of the costs of daycare,
3 
and provision of child tax credits that are limited to mothers' income tax liability (as 
in Israel and the UK).  The fourth argument, which is the focus of the current paper, 
justifies the use of child-related subsidies on re-distributive grounds. Family size is 
used as an efficient indicator ['tagging' device, a la Akerlof (1978)] for the earning 
capacity  of  the  household.  According  to  the  quality/quantity  paradigm  [see  the 
pioneering  studies  of  Becker  (1960)  and  Becker  and  Lewis  (1973)],  low-ability 
families may choose to 'specialize' in quantity, that is, to raise more children relative 
                                            
2  France, Sweden and Quebec, are notable examples of countries that have implemented policies with 
the explicit goal of enhancing fertility [see, e.g., Laroque and Salanie (2008)].  
3  The cost of daycare is a business related expense of parents with young children who need someone 
to look after their children when they are at work. It is a business and personal (that is, consumption) 
mixed cost, as daycare provides value beyond the mere safekeeping of the children. According to basic 
income tax principles, the business part of it should be deducted in computing the taxable income of 
the parent (as is done,  for example, in Canada and in Germany). Most countries do not allow an 
outright  deduction  due  to  the  difficulty  of  separating  the  business  and  consumption  elements,  but 
instead reach some sort of a compromise such as the exclusion of employer provided child care (or 
daycare expenses reimbursed by the employer) from taxable income (as in the US, the Netherlands and 
Japan), or providing a credit in lieu of deduction (as in France).   4
to higher-ability households.
4 In such a case, in a second-best setting [a la Mirrlees, 
(1971)],  where  earning  abilities  are  un-observed  by  the  government;  subsidizing 
larger families can promote a re-distributive goal.  
Indeed, a relatively recent strand in the optimal income tax literature examines 
the potential supplementary re-distributive role of extending the tax base to account 
for the number of children in the household and child-related consumption (such as, 
education  and  daycare).  For  a  comprehensive  recent  review  of  the  literature,  see 
Cigno (2009). This literature challenges some of the key results of the optimal income 
tax literature, such as, the desirability of a zero marginal tax rate levied on top-earners 
[see  Phelps  (1973)  and  Sadka  (1976)]  when  the  skill  distribution  is  bounded,  the 
redundancy of commodity taxation [see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Mirrlees 
(1976)], as well as, the conventional wisdom in tax policy design that the existence of 
children merits a reduction in tax liability (that is, children being a tax asset for their 
parents). The literature emphasizes a key distinction from the standard optimal tax 
setting, which derives from the unique characteristics of children: a crucial part of the 
process  of  rearing  children  may  be  viewed  as  consumption  of  a  non-transferable 
domestically produced good (e.g., parental attention and affection), the production of 
which requires expertise (ability to nurture) that is fundamentally different from the 
ability  to  earn  (the  single  source  of  variation  across  households  in  the  standard 
optimal tax setting). The introduction of a second source of heterogeneity (alongside 
variation  in  earning  ability)  bears  new  re-distributive  implications,  affecting  both 
policy goals and system design. In particular, it is shown that the direction of re-
distribution is not necessarily in favor of the low earning-ability individuals, because 
the latter may enjoy some marked advantage in child-rearing, which may, all-in-all, 
                                            
4 For evidence of the existence of a quality-quantity trade-off see, e.g. Hanushek (1992).    5
compensate (in utility terms) for their low earning capacity.
5 Moreover, the tax system 
design can employ observed family attributes to enhance target efficiency ('tagging'). 
The properties of the optimal integrated tax-transfer system (which allows the tax 
liability to depend on income level, family size as well as expenditure on child-related 
goods) are generally shown to depend on both comparative- and absolute-advantage 
(in domestic vis-à-vis market production) considerations. 
In this paper, we address the key policy issue of the optimal tax treatment of 
children. Employing a continuum version of the two-household framework used by 
Cigno (1986) and (2001), and Cigno and Pettini (2003), we derive the properties of 
the  general  optimal  income  tax  cum  child  benefit  system  set  by  an  egalitarian 
government. As this general system allows for the possibility of making the level of 
child benefits dependent on the household's level of income, we will henceforth refer 
to it as a means-tested system. The special case of an integrated system comprised of 
an  income  tax  component,  which  does  not  depend  on  the  household's  number  of 
children, and a child-benefit component, which does not depend on the household's 
level of income, will be henceforth referred to as a universal system.  
We start by examining the properties of the optimal general system. We show 
that, counter to conventional wisdom, it is desirable to tax children at the margin. That 
is, the total tax liability should rise with the number of children (for a given level of 
income). The mechanism at work is associated with the nature of the quality-quantity 
trade-off faced by the household. In the absence of taxes, low-skill households are 
faced with a lower opportunity (time) cost of raising children relative to high-skill 
ones. Hence, they choose to ‘specialize’ in quantity (number of children), whereas 
high-skill  households  choose  to  ‘specialize’  in  the  quality  of  children  (e.g., 
                                            
5  In our setting, we will maintain the standard assumption in the optimal tax literature that individuals 
only differ in their earning capacity.     6
education). Therefore, (observed) family size may be employed as an indicator for the 
(unobserved) earning capacity of the household (a ‘tagging’ device). This negative 
correlation  between  family  size  and  ability  provides  the  rationale  behind  the 
conventional wisdom calling for subsidizing children on equity grounds. However, in 
a  system  in  which  child  benefits  can  be  made  means-tested,  the  government  can 
employ a more refined notion of correlation between ability and family size; namely, 
the correlation between these two variables which is conditional on income. For a 
given level of income, a high-skill household has more leisure than a low-skill one, as 
it has to work less in order to obtain the same level of income. Hence, conditional on 
income, a high-skill household has a comparative advantage in raising children over 
the low-skill household. Thus, conditional on income, the correlation between family 
size and ability is positive, thereby calling for taxing (rather than subsidizing) children 
at the margin.  
Clearly,  this  somewhat  surprising  result  hinges  on  the  ability  of  the 
government to set child benefits that are means-tested. If the government is restricted 
to a universal system the conditional correlation between ability and family size can 
no longer be of use. The relevant correlation then becomes the unconditional one. 
With taxes in place, the latter correlation cannot be unambiguously signed; hence, one 
cannot determine unequivocally whether children should be taxed (or subsidized) at 
the margin. Nonetheless, we are able to provide some plausible numerical examples, 
in which subsidizing children at the margin is socially desirable, in sharp contrast to 
the general (means-tested) case. 
Naturally, a universal system can never do better than a general (means-tested) 
one. In fact, we are able demonstrate the strict dominance of the means-tested system 
when the skill distribution is discrete (with any arbitrary finite number of skill levels).    7
The structure of the remainder of the paper will be as follows. In the following 
section  we  introduce  the  analytical  framework.  In  section  3  we  formulate  the 
government problem and derive the properties of the general (means-tested) income 
tax cum child benefit system. In section 4, we compare the general (means-tested) 
system with the restricted (universal) one. The universal case is discussed in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
Consider  an  economy  with  a  continuum  of  households.  The  number  of 
households is normalized to unity, with no loss in generality. We assume that the 
production technology employs labor only, and exhibits constant returns to scale and 
perfect substitution across the various skill levels. Households differ in their earning 
ability/skill level (equaling the wage rate, assuming a competitive labor market). We 
let  w  denote  the  wage  rate  and  assume  that  w  is  distributed  over  some,  possibly 
unbounded,  support  ] , [ w w ,  with  a  cumulative  distribution  function  F(w)  and 
corresponding densities ' F f ≡ . We follow Mirrlees (1971) by assuming that abilities 
(wage rates) are unobserved by the government, thus constraining the latter to second-
best re-distributive policies.
6  
All  households  share  the  same  preferences,  represented  by  the  following 
additively separable utility function:  
(1)   )]; ( ) ( [ ) ( ) , , , ( e u n v l h c e n l c V + + + =  
                                            
6 Differences in earning ability are assumed to be the single source of heterogeneity in the economy. 
We thus refrain from introducing horizontal equity considerations into the analysis.   8
where  c  denotes  consumption,  n  denotes  the  number  of  children,  e  denotes  the 
education level per child and l denotes leisure.
7 We assume that v, u and h are strictly 
concave and strictly increasing, and further assume INADA conditions so that interior 
solutions are guaranteed throughout. 
 Several  remarks  are  in  order.  Note  first  that  our  setting  captures  the  fundamental 
quantity-quality  trade-off  [a  la  Becker  (1960)]  faced  by  the  household,  whether  to 
increase the number of children (quantity) or invest in their human capital/education 
(quality).
8,9 The quasi-linear specification rules out income effects, and is assumed for 
tractability purposes [see Diamond (1998) and Salanie (2003) for application in the 
optimal  tax  literature].  It  is  worth  noting  that  Becker  (1960)  conjectured  that  the 
elasticity of family size (quantity/number of children) with respect to income would be 
rather small, which is consistent with some of the empirical evidence [see, e.g., Hotz, 
Klerman and Willis (1997), and more recently Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2007)]. 
Note,  finally,  that  we  follow  the  standard  approach  in  the  endogenous  fertility 
literature and assume that the household can deterministically choose the number of 
children [for models assuming exogenous fertility see, for instance, Cremer, Dellis and 
Pestieau (2003)].  




α ⋅ − − ⋅ =
= ⋅ +
n l w y
n y z e n c
 
                                            
7  Notice that e is measured per-capita, for simplicity; that is, there are no economies of scale embodied 
in the consumption of children. In reality, some economies of scale are likely to exist and are often 
addressed by reference to equivalents scales. Ignoring economies of scale does not affect the qualitative 
nature of our key arguments. In fact, assuming economies of scale could even strengthen our argument.  
8  See, for example, Moav (2005), for a similar setting. 
9 The variable e is interpreted as the level of parental investment in their children’s education, but it 
may  well  take  alternative  interpretations  to  encompass  any  commodity  consumed  by  the  children 
(Becker, 1991), the  maximized lifetime utility of each child (Becker and Barro, 1988) or old age 
support expected by parents from each of their children (Cigno, 1993).    9
where y and z denote gross and net income levels, respectively, and the parameter α
measures the fraction of time parents need to allocate to nurturing activities (raising 
their children).
10 Several remarks are in order. First notice, that we normalize each 
household's time endowment as well as the price levels of both c and e to unity, with 
no loss in generality. Notice further that wealthier households find it more costly to 
raise children, due to the larger opportunity cost they incur (forgoing time in the labor 
market).  Finally,  note  that  we  consider  a  general  non  linear  tax  schedule,  which 
depends both on the number of children and on the level of gross income. This tax 
schedule is implicitly defined by the difference between the gross and net income 
levels,  ) , ( ) , ( n y z y n y t − ≡ . Note that t(y, n) denotes an integrated income tax and 
child benefit system. From an economic point of view, this system, referred to as a 
means-tested system,  cannot be decomposed into separate income tax and means-
tested child benefit components, except in the special case where t(y, n) takes the 
form:  ) ( ) ( ) , ( n b y a n y t + = . The latter is referred to as a universal system, with a(y) 
denoting an income tax component and b(n) denoting a non means-tested (universal) 
child benefit system.  
  The typical household seeks to maximize the utility function in equation (1), 
subject to the budget constraint in (2). Substituting from the budget constraint in (2) 
into the utility function in equation (1) to eliminate c and l, we obtain the indirect 
utility function U(w) given by: 
(3)    { } )] ( ) ( [ ) / 1 ( )] ) , ( [ max ) ( , , e u n v n w y h e n n y z w U e y n + + ⋅ − − + ⋅ − = α  
The first-order-conditions for the typical w-household’s optimal choice are given by: 
                                            
10 We simplify by implicitly assuming that the (time) cost of raising a child cannot be replaced by day-
care services. Our results would remain valid if we allowed for replacement of parents' time by paid 
child-care  services,  as  long  as  parents  maintained  some  role  in  raising  their  children,  which  is 
obviously the case in reality.   10
(4)    − + ) , ( ) ( ' n y z n v n 0 ) / 1 ( ' = − ⋅ − − ⋅ e n w y h α α , 
(5)    0 ) / 1 ( ' / 1 ) , ( = ⋅ − − ⋅ − α n w y h w n y zy , 
(6)    0 ) ( ' = − n e u , 
where  y n z z - 1    and    denote,  respectively,  the  marginal  subsidy  provided  to  an 
additional child, and, the marginal tax rate levied on labor income.
11  
It is straightforward to verify (see appendix A for details) that in the absence 
of any form of government intervention; namely, when  0   and   1   hence,   , = = ≡ n y z z y z , 
the model yields the plausible result suggested by the quantity-quality paradigm: poor 
families will ‘specialize’ in quantity and hence choose to have a larger number of (less 
educated)  children.  The  opposite  will  hold  true  for  wealthy  families:  they  will 
‘specialize’ in quality (educating their offspring). This key observation will later play a 
crucial  role  in  the  design  of  the  welfare  system.  We  next  turn  to  characterize  the 
properties of the integrated income tax cum child benefit system. 
 
3.  The General (Means-Tested) System 
The government seeks to maximize an egalitarian social welfare function given 
by: 
(7)  ∫ =
w
w
w dF w U G W ); ( )] ( [  
where G is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
12 by choosing the tax schedule, 
t(y,n), subject to a revenue constraint: 
                                            
11 We will henceforth assume that the second order conditions are always satisfied, thus employ first-
order  conditions  only  to  characterize  the  individual  incentive  constraints  when  formulating  the 
government problem. This latter assumption will ensure no ‘bunching’ in the optimal solution of the 
government problem [see Ebert (1992), for a rigorous treatment of ‘bunching’ in the context of optimal 
non-linear labor income tax in the continuum case; notice that in the two-type case bunching (that is, 
pooling) will never be part of the optimal solution as shown by Stiglitz (1982)].   11
(8)  ∫ =
w
w
R w dF w n w y t ) ( )] ( ), ( [ ; 
where y(w) and n(w) are the optimal individual choices of the gross income level and 
number of children, respectively, given by the first-order-conditions in (4)-(6); and R 
denotes the (pre-determined) level of government revenue needs. Notice that we start 
by analyzing the most general (means-tested) setting in which taxes/benefits may vary 
across  income  levels  as  well  as  family  size.  Below,  we  also  consider  a  universal 
system (as is often the case in many countries) in which the tax function takes an 
additively separable form:  ) ( ) ( ) , ( n b y a n y t + = .
13 
Following Mirrlees (1971) and (1976) and Salanie (2003), we reformulate the 
government  optimization  problem  (see  appendix  B  for  details)  as  choosing  the 
functions  ) ( ), ( w n w U   and  y(w),  so  as  to  maximize  the  social  welfare  function  in 
equation (7), subject to the revenue constraint: 
(9)   
[ ] [ ] , ) ( )] ( [ )] ( [ )] ( / ) ( 1 [ )] ( [ ) ( ) ( ) ( R w dF w n e u w n v w n w w y h w n e w n w U w y
w
w
= ∫ + + ⋅ − − + ⋅ − − α
 
and the incentive compatibility constraint: 
(10)  ,    all for       , / ) ( ] ) ( / ) ( 1 [ ' ) ( '
2 w w w y w n w w y h w U ⋅ ⋅ − − = α  
where e[n(w)] is implicitly defined by the first-order condition in (6). 
 
                                                                                                                          
12  In the formulation of the welfare function in (10), we take U(w) as the argument; namely, the utility 
driven by the parent. This utility includes an altruistic component derived from providing consumption 
to the offspring [a type of altruism a la Barro (1974) rather than joy-of-giving as in Andreoni (1990)]. 
One could also include the utility derived by the offspring per-se in the welfare calculus in addition to 
that of the altruistic parent. This type of double counting would create a positive externality, justifying 
the  subsidization  of  children.  However,  as  this  paper  focuses  on  the  re-distributive  motive  for 
taxing/subsidizing children, we set aside this alternative motive, without discounting its importance, by 
'laundering out' the child utility component. 
13  It  is  implicitly  assumed  that  the  government  cannot  observe  the  household’s  expenditure  on 
education,  so  the  latter  cannot  be  subsidized  or  taxed.  For  incorporating  taxation  of  child-specific 
commodities in an optimal tax setting with endogenous fertility, see Cigno (2009).   12
It is useful to point out that we do not directly derive the integrated net-income 
function z(y, n). We rather derive the optimal functions y(w), n(w), e(w) and U(w); and 
then calculate  )] ( ), ( [ w n w y z , the net income, employing condition (3): 
(11)  )]. ( [ )] ( [ )] ( / ) ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ), ( [ w e u w n v w n w w y h w e w n w U w n w y z − − ⋅ − − − ⋅ + ≡ α
Note that in this way,  we can only define the net income function, z, and the tax 
function,  z y t − ≡ , at bundles [y(w), n(w), e(w) and U(w)] that are actually observed 
(chosen  by  individuals)  in  the  optimal  solution.  Thus,  z(y,  n)  is  not  well  defined 
elsewhere. Therefore, strictly speaking, one cannot directly derive the marginal income 
tax  rate,  y z − 1 ,  and  the  marginal  child  benefit,  n z .  Instead,  as  is  common  in  the 
literature,  we  define  these  rates  through  the  relevant  individual  marginal  rates  of 
substitution. Indeed,  n z is defined as the marginal rate of substitution of net income 
(c+ne) for children (n) and  y z  is defined as the marginal rate of substitution of net 
income for gross income (y). Formally, using the individual first-order conditions in 
(4) and (5), yields: 
(12)  e h v zn + ⋅ + − = ' ' α  
and 
(13)  w h zy / ' = . 
We next turn to solve the optimization program as an optimal control problem 
employing Pontryagin’s maximum principle. We choose n(w) and y(w) as the two 
control variables and U(w) as the state variable. Formulating the Hamiltonian then 
yields: 
(14)    [ ] [ ]
], / ) / 1 ( ' [        
)] ( [ ) ( ) / 1 ( ) ( ) (
2 w y n w y h
f R n e u n v n w y h n e p n U y U G H
⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ +
⋅ − + + ⋅ − − + ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + =
α µ
α λ
   13
where  ) (w µ  denotes the co-state multiplier,  λ  is the multiplier associated with the 
government revenue constraint and e(n) is given by the implicit solution to the first-
order condition in (6). 
The necessary first-order conditions are: 
(15)
, 0 ) / 1 ( ' '          
)] ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ' ) / 1 ( ' ) ( ' [
2 =
⋅
⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ −





n w y h





λ λ α α λ λ λ
 
(16)
  , 0 ] / ) / 1 ( ' / ) / 1 ( ' ' [           
] / 1 ) / 1 ( ' [
2 3 = ⋅ − − + ⋅ ⋅ − − − ⋅ +
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − =
∂
∂
w n w y h w y n w y h






(17)  ' ) ( ' µ λ − = ⋅ − ⋅ =
∂
∂




The transversality conditions are given by: 
(18)  0 ) ( ) ( = = w w µ µ ,  ( 0 ) ( lim =
∞ → w
w µ ,  when  the  distribution  of  skills  is 
unbounded).  
 Integrating condition (17), employing the transversality condition,  0 ) ( = w µ , yields: 
(19)  [ ] ∫ − =
w
w
t dF t U G w ) ( )] ( [ ' ) ( λ µ . 
Employing the second transversality condition,  0 ) ( = w µ , yields: 
(20)  ∫ =
w
w
t dF t U G ) ( )] ( [ ' λ . 






t dF t U G
w F
w D ) ( )] ( [ '
) ( 1
1
) ( .   14
In words, the function D measures the average social marginal utility of income over 
the interval  ] , [ w w . By virtue of the concavity of G, it follows that D(w) is decreasing. 
Moreover, employing (19) and (20) yields: 
(22)  )] ( ) ( [ )] ( 1 [ ) ( w D w D w F w − ⋅ − = µ , 
(23)  ) (w D = λ . 
Substituting from (22) and (23) into (15), employing the first-order conditions in (4) 
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Strikingly, because h''<0, the optimal condition in (24) suggests that  0 < n z . That is, 
children should be taxed at the margin. Formally, 
Proposition 1: In the optimal integrated tax/benefit system, total tax liability rises 
with the number of children (for a given level of pre-tax income). 
  We obtain a fairly strong result. In a system of child allowance, many may 
advocate  reducing  the  allowance  for  each  additional  child  on  the  grounds  of 
economies of scale in child rearing.
14 Formally, in our setting this would imply that 
the allowance per additional child; namely,  n z , would decline with n, that is  0 < nn z . 
Proposition 1 suggests that  n z itself (not  nn z ) should be negative. Moreover, suppose 
that statutorily, the tax/benefit system is separated into an income tax component, 
a(y),  and  a  means-tested  per-child  allowance,  ) , ( n y k .  That  is, 
n n y k y a n y t ⋅ − = ) , ( ) ( ) , ( .  The  standard  argument  of  economies  of  scale  in  child 
rearing  calls  for  the  average  child  allowance,  k,  to  decline  with  the  number  of 
children, n. The proposition is in fact stronger, as it calls for total child allowance, kn, 
                                            
14 This is essentially the rationale underlying the common use of equivalence scales.   15
to decline with n. This implies that k must decline at a faster rate than the rise in n. 
That is, the elasticity of the per-child allowance, k, with respect to the number of 
children, n, is higher than one (in absolute value). We emphasize that we obtain this 
result even though there are no economies of scale in child rearing in our setting. 
  The rationale for this result is as follows. In the absence of taxes, low-skill 
households are faced with a lower opportunity (time) cost of raising children relative 
to high-skill ones. Hence, they choose to ‘specialize’ in quantity (number of children), 
whereas high-skill households choose to ‘specialize’ in quality (e.g., education). In a 
second best setting, (observed) family size may be employed as an indicator of the 
(unobserved) earning capacity of the household (a ‘tagging’ device).
15 The negative 
correlation  between  family  size  and  ability  provides  the  rationale  behind  the 
conventional wisdom calling for subsidizing children on equity grounds. However, in 
a system in which child benefits can be made means-tested, the government employs 
a more refined concept of correlation between ability and family size for 'tagging' 
purposes; namely, the correlation between these two variables, which is conditional 
on income. To see this, note that for a given level of income, a high-skill household 
has more leisure than a low-skill one, as it has to work less in order to obtain the same 
level  of  income.  Hence,  conditional  on  income,  a  high-skill  household  has  a 
comparative  advantage  in  raising  children  over  the  low-skill  household.  Thus, 
conditional on income, the correlation between family size and ability is positive (and 
not negative as conventional wisdom suggests). In light of the positive correlation 
                                            
15 Note that conditioning transfers on family size serves as a second-best 'tagging' device because 
fertility is an endogenous variable in our setting, which responds to financial incentives offered by the 
government [for recent empirical attempts to estimate the effect of financial incentives on fertility, see 
Cohen, Dehejia and Romanov (2007) and Laroque and Salanie (2008)].   16
between  family  size  and  ability  (conditional  on  income),  taxing  (rather  than 
subsidizing) children at the margin would be socially desirable.
16 
We  turn  next  to  graphically  demonstrate  our  surprising  result  of  the 
desirability of taxing children. For this purpose, recall that we used the first-order 
condition given in (6) to eliminate e, the level of parental investment in per-child 
education,  from  the  government  optimization  program.  This  procedure  essentially 
defines a restricted indirect utility function (where the individual utility maximization 
is conducted with respect to e only). Define this function by: 
(25)  [ ] ) / 1 ( ) ( ) ( max ) , , , ( α ⋅ − − + + + ⋅ − = n w y h e u n v e n z n y z w J e . 
Fixing the gross level of income and employing the envelope theorem, we derive the 
marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  net  income  and  the  number  of  children 
(conditional on the gross level of income, y): 
(26)  ). / 1 ( ' ) ( '
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Differentiating the MRS condition in (26) with respect to n (along the indifference 
curve) yields, after re-arrangement: 
(27)   
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By  differentiation  of  the  indirect  utility  in  (25),  it  follows  that  1 / = ∂ ∂ z J   (hence, 
0 /
2 2 = ∂ ∂ z J ) and  0 /
2 = ∂ ∂ ∂ z n J . Substitution into (27) then yields: 
                                            
16 It is important to emphasize that in equilibrium, high ability households will choose to spend more 
hours in the labor market and raise a lower number of children, relative to low-ability households. 
However, our argument suggests that if they mimic the low ability households (an out-of-equilibrium 
strategy which will not be incentive compatible by construction of our optimal policy rule), then by 


























where  the  inequality  follows  by  virtue  of  the  second  order  conditions  for  the  w-
household optimization ( 0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ n J ).  
We thus conclude that the indifference curve of a w-household in the n-z space (for a 
given level of gross income, y) is U-shaped. Moreover, the slope of the indifference 
curve is decreasing with respect to w. This implies a single crossing property.
17 We let 
the bundle )] ( ), ( ), ( [ ) , , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 w n w y w z n y z = , denote the choice of a  1 w -household in the 
optimal  solution  for  the  government  problem.  Let  ) , , , ( 1 1 n y z w J   describe  the 
indifference curve of  1 w -household in the n-z space (where the level of gross income is 
fixed at 1 y ), which passes through the bundle ) , ( 1 1 z n . We now show that the bundle 
) , ( 1 1 z n must  lie  on  the  declining  portion  of  the  indifference  curve  ) , , , ( 1 1 n y z w J . 
Suppose to the contrary that  ) , ( 1 1 z n , as depicted in figure 1 below, lies on the rising 
portion of the indifference curve. Let  ) , , , ( 1 2 n y z w J , as depicted in figure 1, describe 
the  indifference  curve  of  some  2 w -household  that  passes  through  ) , ( 1 1 z n ,  where 
. 1 2 w w >  For concreteness, suppose that the intersection of the two curves occurs on 





                                            
17  To see this, note that the optimal level of education is given by:  0 ) ( ' = −n e u , which implies that e is 
independent  of  w  conditional  on  n.  Differentiation  with  respect  to  w  then  yields: 
0 / ) / 1 ( ' ' /
2
, < ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ = ∂ ∂ w y n w y h w MRS n z α α . 
18  The fact that the intersection occurs on the declining portion of the indifference curve of the high-
skill  household  is  non-essential.  A  similar  argument  would  apply  for  the  other  case  and  is  hence 
omitted.    18
 
Figure 1: The Optimality of a Marginal Tax 
 
Consider a downward shift along the indifference curve of the  1 w -household [to the 
bundle ) ' , ' ( 1 1 z n ]. By construction, this would maintain the same level of utility for 
this household. Moreover, this will not violate the incentive-compatibility constraint 
of the higher-ability household (the  2 w -household), as the new bundle lies below the 
indifference curve of this household. At the same time, the net income, z, of the  1 w -
household would fall. Recalling that the gross income is kept constant at the level of
1 y , this would imply that the tax liability of the  1 w -household would rise. Thus, we 
were able to show that the government can increase its revenues without reducing the 
utility of any household. This yields the desired contradiction.
19  
                                            
19  Notice  that  we  have  demonstrated  that  subsidizing  children  at  the  margin  would  be  socially 
undesirable. The result that it would be actually optimal to tax children at the margin, derives from the 
fact that when the marginal tax/subsidy is set to zero, a small increase in the marginal tax will have no 
effect  on  government  revenues  (to  the  first  order)  but  will  mitigate  the  incentive  compatibility 
constraint of the higher ability household. This will allow the (egalitarian) government to enhance 
redistribution. 







) , , , ( 1 2 n y z w J  19
Turning  back  to  the  optimal  condition  for  the  marginal  tax  in  (24),  it  is 
straightforward to verify that when  0 = α , the marginal tax (or subsidy) on children is 
set to zero, namely, we replicate the classic result of the redundancy of commodity 
taxation [Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)]. In this particular case, high-ability and low-
ability households faced with the same budget  will choose the same consumption 
allocation (by virtue of the separability of the utility function with respect to leisure), 
as they are faced with the same costs of raising children (the cost of educating them in 
our context, which does not depend on earning ability). It is also easy to verify that 
the  standard  zero  tax  at  the  top  [Phelps  (1973)  and  Sadka  (1976)],  when  the 
distribution of skills is bounded from above, and at the bottom [Seade (1977)] apply. 
   Finally, for the sake of completeness, we can derive a formula for the optimal 
income tax rule in our case, which is similar to the one commonly available in the 





































where  L ε  denotes the labor supply elasticity, given by: 
(30)  .
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4.  Means-Tested versus Universal Systems 
Naturally,  a  general  (means-tested)  tax/benefit  system  cannot  do  worse  than  a 
universal one, which is confined to a separable form (between an income tax and 
child  benefit  components).  An  interesting  question  is  whether  a  universal  system 
(which is fairly prevalent in many OECD countries) can nevertheless suffice in certain 
conditions to attain the social optimum. We are able to show that this is never the case   20
when  the  distribution  of  skill  levels  is  discrete.  Formally,  we  state  and  prove  the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 2: When the distribution of skills is discrete, any universal system can be 
replaced by a means-tested system that attains a higher level of social welfare. 
Proof: See appendix C. 
 
5.  The Universal Case 
In  section  3  we  have  demonstrated,  counter  to  conventional  wisdom,  that  taxing 
children at the margin would be socially desirable for re-distributive purposes, when 
child benefits are allowed to be means-tested. However, in many countries (in fact, in 
most developed countries,) benefits are offered on a universal basis and are not subject 
to  means  testing.  That  is,  the  net  income/benefit  schedule  essentially  takes  an 
additively separable form:  ) ( ) ( ) , ( n b y a n y z + = . Therefore it is of interest and policy 
relevance  to  see  under  what  conditions,  a  universal  system  can  justify  subsidizing 
children at the margin. We attempt to address the following question: starting from any 
given income tax system, under what conditions would introducing a universal system 
of child allowances with marginal subsidies be desirable? 
To address this issue we must first re-formulate the government optimization 
program.  In  this  case  y(w)  is  no  longer  a  control  variable,  but  is  rather  implicitly 
defined by the first-order condition of the household’s utility maximization problem: 
(5’)  . 0 ) / 1 ( ' / 1 ) ( = ⋅ − − ⋅ − α n w y h w y ay  
The government then chooses U(w) and n(w) so as to maximize the social welfare 
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and the incentive-compatibility constraint: 
[ ] ,    all for       , / )] ( [ ) ( / )] ( [ 1 ' ) ( '        ) ' 10 (
2 w w w n y w n w w n y h w U ⋅ ⋅ − − = α  
where y[n(w)] and e[n(w)] are implicitly defined by the first-order conditions in (5’) 
and (6), respectively. 
The Hamiltonian in this case becomes: 
(14’) 
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where  ) (w µ  denotes the co-state multiplier and λ  is the multiplier associated with the 
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The transversality conditions are given, as before, by: 
(33)  0 ) ( ) ( = = w w µ µ   ( 0 ) ( lim =
∞ → w
w µ ,  when  the  distribution  of  skills  is 
unbounded). 
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Following  some  algebraic  manipulations  (which  replicate  those  carried  out  in  the 
general case, and are hence omitted) yields the following expression for the optimal 
marginal child subsidy (where some of the arguments of the functions are omitted to 
abbreviate notation): 
(35)   
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Notice,  that  as  in  the  general  (means-tested)  case,  one  cannot  directly  derive  the 
marginal child benefit,  n b . Instead, we define, as before, the marginal child benefit as 
the marginal rate of substitution of net income (c+ne) for children (n). Formally, using 
the individual first-order condition in (4), yields: 
. ' '         ) ' 12 ( e h v bn + ⋅ + − = α  
It follows by full differentiation of the first-order condition in (5’) with respect 
to n that: 
(36) 











Employing then the second-order-condition [differentiation of the first-order condition 
in (5’) with respect to y], it follows that: 
(37)  0 / ' '
2 < + w h ayy . 
Thus, by virtue of (36),  0 ) ( ' < n y . That is, an increase in the number of children (say in 
response to offering a marginal subsidy) results in a reduction in the labor supply, and 
consequently the gross level of income, as expected. 
Substituting for y'(n) from equation (36) into equation (35) and re-arranging yields: 
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Assuming that the second-order conditions for the government program are satisfied, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the desirability of subsidizing children at the 
margin,  0 > n b ,  is: 
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Namely, starting from a system where the marginal child subsidy is set to zero, social 
welfare will rise by introducing a small marginal child subsidy (thereby increasing the 
number of children). 
By virtue of the fact that y'<0, the condition in (39) holds if-and-only-if: 

























The two first terms in brackets on the left-hand-side of equation (40) are positive [recall 
that  D(w)  is  decreasing  with  respect  to  w];  hence,  they  work  in  the  direction  of 
providing a marginal child subsidy. The sign of the third term in brackets on the left-
hand-side of (40) is however ambiguous. Therefore, the sign of the left-hand side of 
condition  (40)  is  ambiguous  too.  One  can  show  (see  appendix  D)  that  when  the 
marginal child subsidy is set to zero [ n b =0], the third term in brackets [hence, the left-
hand  side  of  condition  (40)]  has  the  opposite  sign  of  n’(w),  which  reflects  the 
correlation between earning ability and family size. The term on the right-hand-side is 
the marginal income tax rate, which is  exogenously  given in our  formulation.  It is 
plausibly assumed that this term is positive, as our model focuses on the intensive 
margin of individual labor supply choice; hence, it works in the direction of levying a 
marginal tax on children. Thus, one cannot a-priori determine the sign of bn. Naturally, 
and as is also evident from condition (40), determining whether providing a marginal   24
child  subsidy  would  be  socially  desirable  or  not  depends  on  the  properties  of  the 
income tax schedule.  
To gain some intuition, we consider several special cases. Consider first the 
simple case in which the marginal tax rate is zero for all levels of income (that is, either 
there  is  no  tax  in  place,  or,  a  lump-sum  tax  is  being  levied).  In  such  a  case, 
0    and    0 1 = = − yy y a a . It follows then that n’(w) < 0 and the term on the left-hand side 
of condition (40) is positive. Because the term on the right-hand side of condition (40) 
vanishes, it follows that providing a marginal child subsidy would be unambiguously 
socially desirable. The rationale for the clear-cut result obtained for this special case is 
as  follows.  In  the  absence  of  taxes,  low-skill  households  will  have  a  comparative 
advantage in raising children, and will hence choose to raise more children than high-
skill ones (namely, n’(w) < 0). The negative correlation between earning ability and 
family  size  in  this  case  can  be  employed  by  the  government  for  re-distributive 
purposes. Subsidizing children at the margin allows the government to target benefits to 
low-ability (poor) households, thereby to enhance re-distribution.  
We  turn  next  to  the  case  where  a  flat  income  tax  is  in  place;  namely, 
0    and    0 1 = > − yy y a a . As can be observed from condition (40), both the left-hand side 
term  and  the  right  hand  side  term  are  unambiguously  positive.  Thus,  one  cannot 
determine a-priori whether a marginal child subsidy would be desirable. Similar to the 
case where no tax is in place, the positive sign of the term on the left-hand side derives 
from the fact that with a flat tax in place, low-skill families still choose to ‘specialize’ 
in quantity (namely, n’(w) < 0); hence, the government can still employ the ensuing 
negative  correlation  between  ability  and  family  size  for  re-distributive  purposes  by 
subsidizing  children  at  the  margin.  However,  unlike  the  case  where  the  marginal 
income tax rate is zero, the desirability of a marginal subsidy is not forgone conclusion,   25
as the sign of the term on the right-hand side is also positive. This term, which is equal 
to the marginal income tax rate, reflects the cost associated with a fiscal crowding out 
effect due to the interaction between the income tax and the child benefit instruments. 
A child subsidy will induce households to give birth to more children and hence to 
spend  less  hours  in  the  labor  market.  This  will  reduce  the  government  revenues 
collected from the income tax system and hence, indirectly, the level of re-distribution. 
Obviously,  when  the  marginal  income  tax  rate  is  zero,  that  is  0 1 = − y a ,  this  term 
disappears (there is no  crowding out effect).  In general, this term will work in the 
direction of levying a tax on children. Thus, although the negative correlation between 
ability and family size is maintained under a flat (linear) income tax system, one cannot 
determine a-priori whether a marginal subsidy is desirable or not.  
In the two cases examined above the marginal income tax rate is constant 
across different levels of income. Hence, the term on the left-hand side of (40), which 
captures the welfare gain from ‘tagging’, was unambiguously positive.  Clearly, this 
need not be the case with a non-linear income tax system in place. To see this, consider 
the  case  where  the  marginal  income  tax  rate  rises  with  respect  to  income,  that  is 
. 0 < yy a  When the marginal income tax rate rises sufficiently rapidly (that is,  yy a is 
sufficiently negative), then the third term in brackets on the left-hand-side of condition 
(40), and with it the entire expression on the left-hand-side of this condition, become 
negative. In such a case, the expression on the left-hand side of  (40) will work, all-in-
all, in the direction of levying a marginal tax on children. The rationale for this result is 
as follows. In general, we expect high-ability households to choose a higher level of 
gross  labor  income  than  that  chosen  by  low-ability  households.  Thus,  high-ability 
households  face  a  higher  marginal  income  tax  rate  than  that  faced  by  low-ability 
households. When the marginal tax rate will rise sufficiently rapidly, the net-of-tax   26
wage rate of high-ability households may fall below that of low-ability households. 
When the net-of-tax wage rate of high-ability households will be sufficiently smaller 
than that of low-ability ones, the patterns of comparative advantage of child-rearing 
will reverse, and high-ability households will choose to raise more children than low-
ability ones (namely, n’(w) > 0). The ensuing positive correlation between ability and 
family size implies that a marginal child tax (rather than a subsidy) would be desirable.  
Naturally, in the  case  where the marginal income tax rate diminishes with 
respect  to  income  (namely,  0 > yy a ),  the  net-of-tax  wage  rate  of  high-ability 
households is higher than that of low-ability households, with the difference becoming 
even larger than in the flat-tax case. Hence, the negative correlation between earning 
ability  and  family  size  becomes  yet  stronger.  The  term  on  the  left-hand  side  of 
condition (40) is definitely positive, and hence  calls for subsidizing children at the 
margin as a ‘tagging’ device. If this effect is stronger than the crowding out effect 
reflected by the positive term on the right-hand side of condition (40), then a marginal 
child subsidy is desirable.  
To sum up, we have demonstrated that the desirability of subsidizing children 
at  the  margin  under  a  universal  child  allowance  system  is  far  from  being  forgone 
conclusion and is highly sensitive to the properties of the income tax schedule. 
We resort next to numerical simulations to examine whether the condition in 
(40)  for  the  desirability  of  a  marginal  child  subsidy  can  hold  under  reasonable 
parametric assumptions. Saez (2002) approximates the US tax system by a linear tax 
schedule with a constant marginal tax rate of 40 percent. That is, we set  6 . 0 = y a  and 
0 = yy a .  Following  Diamond  (1998),  we  assume  a  single  peaked  density  of  skills, 







) ( 1  initially decreases up to the modal skill level and is then constant. It 






) ( 1  is bounded from below, where the lower bound is given 
by one over the coefficient of the Pareto distribution. Following Finberg and Poterba 
(1993), we assume a Pareto coefficient in the range 0.5 to 1.5, which implies that that 






) ( 1  varies in the range of 2/3 to 2. Assuming a 
Rawlsian  social  welfare  function  implies  that  D(w)=0.  Substituting  the  parametric 
values into the condition in (40) implies that a marginal subsidy is indeed desirable 
over the entire range of productivities (wage rates).  
Notice  that,  as  pointed  out  by  Saez  (2001),  the  correct  Pareto  coefficient 
should be the one associated with (empirically unobserved) productivity distribution 
rather than that associated with observed income distribution. As suggested by Saez 
(2001), for the case of the Pareto distribution, assuming an iso-elastic labor supply, the 
coefficient  associated  with  the  productivity  distribution  (
p a )  is  related  to  that 
associated with income distribution (
I a ) by the following formula: 
P
L
I a a = + ⋅ ) 1 ( ε , 
where  L ε   denotes  the  (uncompensated)  labor  supply  elasticity.  Thus,  a  more 






) ( 1  would be slightly lower 
than the values in the range specified above (in light of the fact that labor supply is 
fairly inelastic according to empirical findings).
20 This would suggest that at least for 
the lower end of the productivity distribution, a marginal subsidy is fairly plausible. In 
light of our parametric assumption, there would be a cutoff level of productivity, below 
                                            
20 Most estimates of the intensive margin elasticity (hours of work conditional on participating in the 
labor market) are small. See, for example, the survey by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).    28
which a marginal child subsidy would be provided and above which a marginal child 
tax would be imposed.  
To see this, notice first that with a flat income tax schedule, the expression in 
equation (36) reduces to: 
(41)  w n y ⋅ − = α ) ( ' . 
Then,  assuming  that  the  marginal  tax  rate  is  0<t<1  and  a  Rawlsian  social  welfare 
function, the optimal marginal child subsidy/tax in (38) is given by: 
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) ( 1  is sufficiently high for sufficiently low w, and is decreasing 
over the range of skills up to the modal skill level and is then constant. Thus bn is 
positive (a marginal child subsidy) at the lower end of the wage distribution and may be 
negative (a marginal child tax) at the higher end of the wage distribution.  
    Another interesting observation follows from the expression for the optimal 
marginal subsidy/tax in equation (42). As the expression on the right-hand side of this 
equation is decreasing in w for the lower end of the wage distribution [recall that we 
assume, following Diamond (1998), a single-peaked density of skills], then as low-
ability  (poor)  households  tend  to  raise  more  children  (due  to  their  comparative 
advantage), it follows that the marginal subsidy increases with respect to the number of 
children, for households with a sufficiently large number of children. Strikingly, such a 
system of subsidies has been in place in Israel since 1975 but allowances were mostly 
flattened (subject to some grandfathering clauses) in 2003. Indeed, Israel has a fairly   29
generous universal (non-means-tested) child allowance system. A notable feature of the 
program  until  June  2003  was  that  the  size  of  the  allowance  per  child  increased 
substantially with the birth order of the child, with the first two children up to the age of 




6.  Conclusion 
The economic literature, starting with the seminal contributions of Becker (1960) 
and Becker and Lewis (1973), viewed household family planning as an economic 
decision, where the household chooses the number of children to raise and the bundle 
of goods to consume, so as to maximize its utility. Thus, the size of the household is 
optimally  determined  by  comparing  the  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  raising 
children. 
The literature has emphasized a fundamental trade-off between the quantity (of 
children) and their quality (e.g., parental investment in education and commodities 
consumed  by  the  children).  Under  plausible  assumptions  (supported  by  empirical 
evidence),  comparative  advantage  considerations  would  induce  low-skill  (poor) 
households to specialize in quantity, whereas high-skill (wealthy) households would 
choose  to  specialize  in  quality.  Conventional  wisdom  therefore  suggests  that  in  a 
second-best setting, the (observed) family size could be used as a screening ('tagging') 
                                            
21 Such a structure went against standard arguments of increasing returns to scale in child rearing. In 
2001, the allowances for children from the fifth up were close to doubled as a result of a strong ultra-
orthodox lobby in the Israeli parliament. The ultra-orthodox (and Muslims) in Israel traditionally give 
birth to a larger number of children, rendering them the primary beneficiaries of such a non-linear pattern 
of subsidies. This controversial legislation sparked off a major public outcry that resulted in a backlash in 
2003, equalizing the per child allowance for all children. What we show in the current setting is that there 
could be in fact a re-distributive argument supporting this patently counter-intuitive pattern.   
   30
device  for  re-distributive  purposes  by  an  egalitarian  government,  and  call  for 
subsidizing children. 
In this paper, we challenge this conventional wisdom. Specifically, we show that 
subsidizing children may indeed be warranted under special circumstances, provided 
that child allowances are universal (non means-tested). However, when means-testing 
is allowed, it is optimal to tax children at the margin (namely, setting the total child 
benefits to decline with the number of children), rather than to subsidize them. Thus, 
deciding whether to subsidize or to tax children crucially hinges on whether child 
benefits are provided on a universal or a means-tested basis.   31
Appendix A: Demonstration of the Quantity-Quality Trade-off 
In this appendix we show that in the absence of government intervention, poor (low-
skill) families will choose to 'specialize' in quantity; whereas, wealthy  (high-skill) 
households will choose to 'specialize' in quality. 
Substituting for  ) ( ' ⋅ h  from (5) into (4) and (6) and setting  1   and   0 = = y n z z  yields: 
(A1)  − ) ( ' n v 0 = − ⋅ e w α , 
(A2)  0 ) ( ' = − n e u . 
The system of two equations [(A1) and (A2)] implicitly define the optimal solution for 
the number of children and the level of education as a function of the wage rate [n(w) 
and e(w)]. Fully differentiating the two first-order conditions in (A1) and (A2) with 
respect to w yields: 
(A3)  − ⋅ ) ( ' ) ( ' ' w n n v 0 ) ( ' = − w e α , 
(A4)      0 ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ' ' = − ⋅ w n w e e u  
Applying Cramer’s Rule, one then obtains: 
(A5)    ∆ = ∆ ⋅ = / ) ( '     ; / ) ( ' ' ) ( ' α α w e e u w n , 
where  0 1 ) ( ' ' ) ( ' ' > − ⋅ ≡ ∆ e u n v , by the second order conditions.  
It  therefore  follows  that  n’(w)<0  and  e’(w)>0  (the  former  follows  from  the  strict 
concavity of u).    32
Appendix B: Reformulation of the Government Optimization Problem 
 
In this appendix we derive the expressions for the revenue constraint [equation (9)] 
and  the  incentive  constraint  [equation  (10)]  that  appear  in  the  re-formulated 
government problem in the main body of the text.  
Following  the  standard  approach  in  the  optimal  tax  literature,  the  government  is 
essentially  offering  the  individuals  with  a  tax  schedule  given  by  the  triplet  of 
functions,  ) (    and    ) ( ), ( w n w y w z , that is, bundles comprised of the net-income, gross 
income and the number of children, from which each household is self-selecting the 
optimal bundle. The total tax revenues collected given the optimal choices taken by 
the individuals satisfy the government (pre-determined) revenue needs.  
We  first  turn  to  derive  the  incentive  constraint  given  by  equation  (10).  We  let 
] , , , [ n y z w J denote the maximal level of utility derived by a household with ability 
level w, net income level  z , gross income level y and number of children n. Formally, 
(B1)  [ ] ) / 1 ( ) ( ) ( max ] , , , [ α ⋅ − − + + + ⋅ − = n w y h e u n v e n z n y z w J e . 
By definition of the indirect utility function in (3) it follows that: 
(B2)  )] , , , [ max ) ( , , n y z w J w U n y z = . 
Denoting by z(w), y(w) and n(w), the optimal choices of the w-household, it follows 
that: 
(B3)  )] ( ), ( ), ( , [ ) ( w n w y w z w J w U ≡ . 
Fully differentiating the identity in (B3) with respect to w yields: 




























The w-household's incentive constraint is defined by the following condition: 
(B5)  )] ' ( ), ' ( ), ' ( , [ max arg ' w n w y w z w J w w = .   33
In words, the w-household has no incentives to mimic other types; hence it will choose 
to reveal its true type (rather than to pretend to be some other type, w'). Re-formulating 
the condition in (B5) as a first-order condition yields: 


















Substituting from (B6) into (B4) then yields: 
(B7)  [ ]
w





) ( ), ( ), ( ,
) ( ' . 
Thus,  the  condition  in  (B6)  holds  if-and-only-if  the  condition  in  (B7)  holds. 
Employing (B1) yields then the following expression, which is identical to equation 
(10): 
(B8)  . / ) ( ] ) ( / ) ( 1 [ ' ) ( '
2 w w y w n w w y h w U ⋅ ⋅ − − = α  
We  turn  next  to  the  government  revenue  constraint,  given  by  equation  (9).  For 
convenience, we modify the tax schedule offered by the government [given by the 
triplet  of  functions,  ) (    and    ) ( ), ( w n w y w z ]  by  replacing  the  function  z(w),  the  net 
income  level,  with  the  function  U(w),  the  indirect  utility  level  in  the  individual 
optimization.
22 Recalling that the tax function is implicitly defined by the difference 
between  the  gross  income  and  the  net  income,  ) , ( ) , ( n y z y n y t − ≡ ,  the  revenue 
constraint in (8) can be re-written as follows: 
(B9)  [ ] ∫ = −
w
w
R w dF w n w y z w y ) ( )] ( ), ( [ ) ( . 
                                            
22 Notice, that, given the optimal choice of the level of education as a function of the number of 
children  [determined  by  the  first-order-condition  in  (6)],  the  triplet  > < ) ( ), ( ), ( w n w y w z uniquely 
determines the level of utility, U(w), by virtue of condition (3). Thus, our transformation is with no loss 
in generality.   34
Recalling  that  z(w),  y(w),  n(w)  and  e(w),  denote  the  optimal  choices  of  the  w-
household;  substitution  for  )] ( ), ( [ w n w y z   from  condition  (3)  into  (B9)  and  re-
arrangement yields the following expression, which is identical to equation (9): 
(B10) 
[ ] [ ] . ) ( )] ( [ )] ( [ )] ( / ) ( 1 [ )] ( [ ) ( ) ( ) ( R w dF w n e u w n v w n w w y h w n e w n w U w y
w
w
= ∫ + + ⋅ − − + ⋅ − − α
 
This completes the derivation.   35
Appendix C: A Means-Tested System Strictly Dominates the Universal one 
In this appendix we demonstrate the dominance of a means-tested child benefit system 
over a universal one. We restrict attention to a setting with a discrete distribution of 
skill levels. 
Consider an economy with a finite number of skill levels denoted by: N i wi .... 2 , 1 ; = , 
where  N N w w w w < < < < −1 2 1 ...... 0 . We normalize the number of individuals of each 
type to unity with no loss in generality. We let  ] , ), , ( , [ n y n y z w J i denote the maximal 
level of utility derived by a household with ability level wi, gross income level y, net 
income level  ) , ( n y z and number of children n. Formally, 
(C1)  [ ] ) / 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( max ] , ), , ( , [ α ⋅ − − + + + ⋅ − = n w y h e u n v e n n y z n y n y z w J i e i . 
We assume that the government is implementing a universal system; namely: 
(C2)  ) ( ) ( ) , ( n b y a n y z + = . 
We turn to show that any universal system of the form given in condition (C2) can be 
replaced by a means-tested system that maintains the government revenue requirement 
and attains a higher level of welfare. 
Denote by  ) , ( i i n y  the optimal choice of an individual with skill-level i w , faced with 
the universal system given in condition (C2). Consider the following (means-tested) 







otherwise       ) , (
,                 0
) , ( ˆ
1 1
n y z
n n y y
n y z  
Notice, that indeed the schedule given in (C3) is means-tested. To see this consider 
some arbitrary number of children,  1 n n ≠ . Then, the marginal child subsidy is given 
by b’(n) for levels of income  1 y y ≠  and zero when the income level is  1 y .    36
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal choices of the individuals under the 
modified system given by (C3) will coincide with choices taken under the system in 
(C2). 
By revealed preference considerations, it follows that: 
(C4)  ] , ), , ( , [ ] , ), , ( , [ max ] , ), , ( , [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 n y n y z w J n y n y z w J n y n y z w J i i n i i i i i ≥ ≥ ,  
for all i>1. 
In fact, the last inequality in condition (C4) is strict as long as  0 > α . To see this, 
notice that by the individual first-order conditions: 
(C5)  − + ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 1 n b n v 0 ) / 1 ( ' 1 1 1 1 = − ⋅ − − ⋅ e n w y h α α , 
(C6)  0 ) ( ' 1 1 = −n e u . 
Hence by the concavity of h, 
(C7)  − + ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 1 n b n v 0 ) / 1 ( ' 1 1 1 > − ⋅ − − ⋅ e n w y h i α α ,  
for all i>1. 
Thus, conditional on the level of income,  1 y , the optimal number of children chosen 
by an individual of type i>1 differs from  1 n . Obviously, when  0 = α , all types will 
chose the same number of children (conditional on income). In this case, child benefits 
are redundant. 
Let  ] , ), , ( , [ ] , ), , ( , [ max 1 1 1 1 1 1 n y n y z w J n y n y z w J i i n i − ≡ δ .  As  we  have  just  shown, 
0 > i δ  for all i>1. Further, let  0 ) ( min 1 > ≡ > i i δ δ . 









= = ⋅ − +
≠ =
=
otherwise                          / ) , (
,           / ) 1 ( ) , (
,                                                 0
) , ( 1 1
1 1
*
N n y z
n n y y N N n y z
n n y y
n y z
δ
δ    37
The tax-transfer schedule in (C8) is a modification of the schedule given in (C3). This 
schedule is obtained by levying a lump sum tax by the amount δ on all income levels 
different than  1 y , and then distribute the entailed extra tax revenues in a lump sum 
fashion. Notice that by construction of δ , the optimal choices of the individuals will 
still  coincide  with  those  obtained  under  the  schedule  given  in  (C3)  and  (C2). 
Moreover, the government revenue constraint will still be satisfied. However, as we 
redistribute resources from individuals of type i>1 towards the least well-off individual 
(i=1), we obtain a welfare gain, due the strictly concave welfare function [given in 
(10)]. 
The idea underlying the construction was that by forcing individuals of type i>1 who 
mimic the least well-off type (i=1), by choosing her level of income, also to choose the 
same number of children, we create a slack in the binding incentive constraints. We 
can then employ this slack to redistribute more towards the least well-off individual. 
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Appendix D: The Correlation between Family Size and Earning Ability and the 
Properties of the Income Tax Schedule 
 
In this appendix we state and prove the following claim: 
Claim:  0        if only    and   if    0     ) ( ' > = < + ⋅ < = > y yy a y a w n  
Proof: We reproduce, for convenience, the w-household's first-order conditions, given 
in equations (4)-(6), assuming a universal system, namely,  ) ( ) ( ) , ( n b y a n y z + =  and 
setting the marginal child subsidy to zero ( 0 = n b ): 
(D1)  − ) ( ' n v 0 ) / 1 ( ' = − ⋅ − − ⋅ e n w y h α α , 
(D2)  0 ) / 1 ( ' = ⋅ − − − ⋅ α n w y h w ay , 
(D3)  0 ) ( ' = − n e u . 
We let g denote the inverse of u' (which is well-defined by the strict concavity of u). 
Hence, g(n)=e. Substituting into (D1) and (D2) then yields: 
(D1')  − ≡ ) ( ' ) , , ( n v w y n H , 0 ) ( ) / 1 ( ' = − ⋅ − − ⋅ n g n w y h α α  
(D2')  . 0 ) / 1 ( ' ) , , ( = ⋅ − − − ⋅ ≡ α n w y h w a w y n K y  
The systems of two equations [(D1') and (D2')] provide an implicit solution for n(w) 
and y(w), the optimal choices of the w-household.   
Fully differentiating the two conditions in (D1') and (D2') with respect to w yields: 
(D4)  , 0 / ) ( ' / ) ( ' / = ∂ ∂ + ⋅ ∂ ∂ + ⋅ ∂ ∂ w H w y y H w n n H  
(D5)  . 0 / ) ( ' / ) ( ' / = ∂ ∂ + ⋅ ∂ ∂ + ⋅ ∂ ∂ w K w y y K w n n K  
Employing Cramer's Rule then yields: 
(D6) 
y H n K y K n H
y H w K y K w H
w n
∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ −
=
/ / / /
/ / / /
) ( '    39
By  the  second-order  conditions  of  the  household's  optimization  it  follows  that 
y H n K y K n H ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ / / / / >0. Thus, it follows: 
(D7)  ] / / / / [ )] ( ' [ y H w K y K w H Sign w n Sign ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ −∂ = . 
Differentiating the household's first-order conditions in (D1') and (D2') yields: 
(D8) 
2 / ) / 1 ( ' ' / w y n w y h w H ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ − = ∂ ∂ α α , 
(D9)  w n w y h y H / ) / 1 ( ' ' / α α ⋅ − − ⋅ = ∂ ∂ , 
(D10)  w n w y h w a y K yy / ) / 1 ( ' ' / α ⋅ − − + ⋅ = ∂ ∂ , 
(D11) 
2 / ) / 1 ( ' ' / w y n w y h a w K y ⋅ ⋅ − − − = ∂ ∂ α . 
Substituting from (D8)-(D11) into (D7) and re-arranging then yields: 
(D12)  y H w K y K w H ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ − / / / / = ] [ / ) / 1 ( ' ' y yy a y a w n w y h + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ α α . 
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